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FREE SPEECH, OFFICIAL HISTORY AND NATIONALIST 




The past two decades have seen an explosion of memory laws, 
especially in Eastern Europe, and an explosion of objections to them. 
According to critics, memory laws (1) violate freedom of speech; (2) 
create an official history; and (3) foster a narrow, particularistic politics. 
This Essay evaluates these competing arguments. The free speech 
objection lumps all memory laws together—regardless of content—and 
runs the risk of becoming an objection to hate speech bans more 
generally, something that limits its appeal outside of the United States. 
Opposing memory laws as official history is narrower, but it privileges 
the national history and historians who guard it. Furthermore, neither 
objection gets to the deeper, political threat posed by a newer generation 
of nationalistic memory laws arising in Eastern Europe. To highlight this 
threat, memory law opponents should object to the narrow, exclusionist 
politics that underlay many memory laws. In this regard, opponents 
should link memory laws to laws that seek to shape the nation by 
restricting immigration and indoctrinating immigrants. At the same time, 
the political objection will not generally appeal to the nationalists 
themselves, especially if it comes from those seen as liberals. Therefore, 
it is helpful for memory law opponents to supplement the political 
argument with arguments based on free speech and official history. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The past two decades have seen an explosion of memory laws—
especially punitive ones. Paralleling this has been an explosion of wide-
ranging objections to memory laws. One might, for instance, object to a 
genocide denial ban (or law a forbidding the disrespecting of the Red 
Army)1 on free speech grounds; or one might oppose it as fostering bad 
politics. This essay rests on the premise that the arguments one chooses 
make a difference. In particular, I advance two points. First, the tendency 
to oppose memory laws on free speech grounds, or as state-enforced 
history, while important, does not get at the deeper, political threat posed 
by a newer generation of more particularistic memory laws.2 Second, we 
can learn a great deal about memory laws—and how to oppose them—if 
we place them in the larger context of how states use law to enforce 
restrictive notions of national identity.3    
In what follows, I first distinguish punishing genocide denial (and 
potentially other past statements) as hate speech4 from memory laws per 
se.5 Next, I lay out three categories of objections to memory laws:6 (1) 
they violate freedom of speech;7 (2) they create an official history;8and 
(3) in some instances, they foster a narrow, particularistic politics.9 For 
each objection, I describe the nature of the argument and the problems it 
encounters. While the political objection is powerful, it leans on the a 
priori premise that a nationalistic, exclusionary form of politics is 
morally illegitimate. For that reason, the next section looks at other laws 
 
 1. The law, cited in NIKOLAY KOPOSOV, MEMORY LAWS: MEMORY WARS: THE POLITICS 
OF THE PAST IN EUROPE AND RUSSIA 10 (Peter Baldwin et al. eds., 2018) punishes the 
“dissemination of knowingly false information on the activities of the USSR during the Second 
World War.” 
 2. This Essay owes a great debt to Koposov’s MEMORY LAWS: MEMORY WARS, especially 
his distinction between Western (universal) and Eastern (particularistic) memory laws. Id. at 9–
10. 
 3. To be sure, there is an important difference here. Memory laws, by definition, involve 
the past; identity-enhancing laws may turn on sense of belonging anchored in an idealized past, 
but they do not necessarily dictate how society views that past. See ANTHONY SMITH, THE ETHNIC 
ORIGINS OF NATIONS (1986) (discussing the role played by an idealized ethnic past in modern 
nationalist arguments). 
 4. This category clearly covers qualified denial, i.e. statements that blame the false 
genocide on the victim group (“The Holocaust is a Zionist hoax”). It may cover bare denial where 
the denial language is code for hate speech. 
 5. See infra Part I. 
 6. See infra Part II. 
 7. See infra Part II.A. 
 8. See infra Part II.B. 
 9. See infra Part II.C 
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motivated by exclusionary nationalism—especially anti-immigrant 
laws—that share a family resemblance to particularistic memory laws.10 
The conclusion recognizes the importance of the free speech and official 
history objections on pragmatic grounds, while highlighting the benefits 
of viewing memory laws through the prism of national identity.11 
I.  WHAT MEMORY LAWS ARE NOT 
Before going into the objections to memory laws, there is a 
preliminary question: How do memory laws differ from other speech 
restrictions, such as hate speech bans? Writing in 2006 about 
negationism, Emanuela Fronza spoke of laws that “seek to establish 
through the imposition of a criminal sanction, a single interpretation of 
history.”12 According to Fronza, “people should not be prosecuted for 
what they are or want, but only for what they do.”13 Here Fronza 
highlights an important distinction between punishing speech to protect 
a given historical narrative and punishing those situations in which 
speech “bring[s] prejudice to the interests or rights of another, or where 
they are offensive to a group,” something she favors.14 This, in turn, 
mirrors the distinction between punishing bare denial of the facts of a 
genocide (“The Holocaust did not happen”) and punishing qualified 
denial, in which the denial combines with language targeting a given 
group (“The Holocaust is a Jewish lie”).15  
There are some puzzles here for memory law scholars. Most would 
accept that qualified denial is hate speech, at least in countries with hate 
speech bans. The harder question is whether hate speech bans, when used 
against qualified denial, should count as “punitive memory laws.” I 
would argue they should not. A hate speech ban may, in some 
circumstances, act as a law affecting memory, but it is not a memory law 
per se because punitive impulse does not come from protecting historical 
events, it comes from the goal of stopping hate. A hate speech ban does 
not distinguish between statements such as: “The Holocaust is a Jewish 
lie,” “Jews run the world,” and “Let’s kill the Jews.” Or, to take the 
argument to an extreme, consider a mugger who confronts a victim on a 
dark street and says, “Give me your money, or I’ll break your lying-
 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. See infra Part IV. 
 12. Emanuela Fronza, Punishment of Negationism: The Difficult Dialogue Between Law 
and Memory, 30 VT. L. REV. 609, 611 (2006). 
 13. Id. at 622. 
 14. Id. at 621. 
 15. For more on the bare versus qualified denial distinction, see Thomas Hochmann, One 
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about-the-Holocaust Jewish legs!” Punishing the mugger under a robbery 
statute is not what we traditionally think of when discussing memory 
laws.16 
What, then, about laws that punish bare acts of genocide denial? Are 
they punitive memory laws? They often are, especially if the motivation 
for the ban stems from a desire to “apologize” for the genocide in 
question.17 Likewise, a country that bans Holocaust denial to comply with 
the 2008 Framework Declaration is likely enacting a punitive memory 
ban. The harder cases emerge where the Holocaust denial ban is enacted 
to combat anti-Semitism by blocking one of its ways of transmission.18 Is 
this the state favoring a given historical view, or merely punishing hate 
speech in a particularly clumsy way?19 On one level, this is an empirical 
question: How prevalent is coded anti-Semitism in the country in 
question?   
Let me give an example from a slightly different context. In the United 
States, the Supreme Court has banned cross burning when done with an 
intent to intimidate.20 Dissenting, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that, 
in the United States context, cross burning is always intimidatory.21 
While the opinions in Virginia v. Black are dripping with memory,22 the 
holding—that a state may punish cross burning when it intimidates 
others—is neutral vis-à-vis history.  The goal is to protect citizens against 
intimidation, not to foster a singular meaning about the past. One can 
approach Holocaust denial bans—and some other genocide denial bans—
from a similar perspective; are they primarily concerned about 
combatting hatred, or enforcing a singular version of the past? 
 
 16. If, on the other hand, the mugger receives an enhanced sentence under a hate crime law, 
we have a closer case, even though here the statement is qualified rather than bare denial. 
 17. See ULADZISLAU BELAVUSAU, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: IMPORTING EUROPEAN AND US 
CONSTITUTIONAL MODELS IN TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACIES, 172–73 (2013). 
 18. For connection between Holocaust denial and anti-Semitism, see DEBORAH LIPSTADT, 
DENYING THE HOLOCAUST, THE GROWING ASSAULT ON TRUTH AND MEMORY 32 (Basic Books 
1993). 
 19. For the argument that Holocaust denial is hate speech, see Robert A. Kahn, Holocaust 
Denial and Hate Speech, in GENOCIDE DENIALS AND THE LAW 74 (Ludovic Hennebel & Thomas 
Hochmann eds., 2011) (describing Holocaust denial as past directed hate). Over the past few 
years, I have changed my views somewhat. I no longer think Holocaust denial is always 
prosecutable as hate speech, but I believe it can be in some instances. Rob Kahn, Can the Law 
Understand the Harm of Genocide Denial?, in DENIALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 215 (J. Willems, 
H. Nelson & R. Moerland, eds., 2016).   
 20. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 338 (2003); for more, see Robert A. Kahn, Did the Burning 
Cross Speak? Virginia v. Black and the Debate Between Justices O’Connor and Thomas over the 
History of Cross Burning, in 35 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 75 (Austin Sarat ed., 
2006). 
 21. Virginia, 538 U.S. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 22. See Kahn, supra note 20. Both Justice O’Connor, who wrote the majority opinion, and 
Justice Thomas make their case by describing the import of cross burning in American history. 
4
Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 31 [], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol31/iss1/2
2019] FREE SPEECH, OFFICIAL HISTORY AND NATIONALIST POLITICS 37 
 
There are advantages in viewing some Holocaust denial bans as hate 
speech laws in disguise. First, it helps resolve what I would call the 
“Gayssot problem,” namely the tendency of the fiercest critics of most 
punitive memory bans to waffle when it comes to removing Holocaust 
denial bans. For example, French historian Pierre Nora, one of the leaders 
of Liberté pour l’Historie, is agnostic when it comes to removing the 
Gayssot Law.23 The fear is that removal will unleash a torrent of anti-
Semitism. Maybe his fears are justified; maybe they are not.24 The same 
applies to the Gayssot Law itself. As a student of the prosecutions of 
Robert Faurisson, and the problems courts encountered in the early 1980s 
in hearing his case without “judging history,”25 I can attest to how the 
Gayssot Law, by making the crime “questioning the Holocaust” rather 
than “falsifying history,” made for smoother prosecutions in the 1990s.26 
That said, reading the legislative debates over the Gayssot Law’s passage, 
I encountered very little about the Faurisson trials or the dilemmas facing 
potential prosecutors of deniers. Instead, the focus was on stopping Jean 
Marie Le Pen and sending a larger message that French society was 
opposed to genocide denial.27 If, as an empirical matter, it is likely that 
Gayssot law was not enacted primarily to punish anti-Semitism, the 
disguised hate speech rationale still might explain why so many memory 
law opponents are unwilling to repeal it. 
Second, the hate speech in disguise approach helps explain the 
position of those who support Holocaust denial bans but reject most other 
punitive memory bans.28 As Aleksandra Glisczyńska-Grabias puts it: 
“Genocide denial may in fact constitute a mechanism for stirring up hate 
and excluding minorities by stigmatizing them as liars who have 
fabricated their suffering.”29 It does so by sending the message, “We 
 
 23. See Robert A. Kahn, Does it Matter How One Opposes Memory Bans? A Critical 
Commentary on Liberté pour l’Histoire, 15 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 55, 76 (2016) 
(quoting Pierre Nora, History, Memory and the Law in France (1990–2008); LIBERTE POUR 
L’HISTOIRE (Jan. 14, 2011), http://www.lph-asso.fr/index53e5.html?option=com_content&view 
=article&id=159%3Apierre-nora-qlhistoire-la-memoire-et-la-loi-en-france-1990-2008q&catid= 
53%3Aactualites&Itemid=170&lang=fr). 
 24. Interestingly, the fear that repeal will have negative effects against the minority group 
protected by the ban was voiced by Jewish and Muslim communities in Denmark during the 
Danish debate over repealing its blasphemy ban.  See Rob Kahn, Five Thoughts about the Repeal 
of Denmark’s Blasphemy Ban, 19 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 120, 138–39 (2018).  
 25. See ROBERT A. KAHN, HOLOCAUST DENIAL AND THE LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, 33–
35, 37 (2004). 
 26. Id. at 108–11. 
 27. Id. at 105–08. 
 28. See Grayżna Baranowska & Anna Wójcik, In defence of Europe’s memory laws, THE 
FREE SPEECH DEBATE (Nov. 1, 2017), http://freespeechdebate.com/discuss/in-defence-of-
europes-memory-laws/; Aleksandra Glisczyńska-Grabias, Law and Memory, MEMORY LAWS IN 
EUROPEAN AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Mar. 2018), http://melaproject.org/blog/249. 
 29. Glisczyńska-Grabias, supra note 28. 
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killed you, but that’s ok. Nobody cares.” Again, this is an empirical 
question. For Thomas Hochmann, writing about Armenian genocide 
denial, the question is whether such denial “threatens, in every case, to 
provoke sufficient harmful consequences.”30 The phrase “in every case” 
points to the nub of the issue. To the extent Holocaust denial is always 
coded anti-Semitism, a blanket ban might be justified; much as for Justice 
Clarence Thomas, a burning cross almost always intimidates. Answering 
this question affirmatively will be difficult, but it is a theoretical 
possibility.31 
At the same time, using blanket denial bans to punish hate speech may 
not be wise social policy. Indeed, excluding disguised hate speech bans 
from the family of “punitive memory laws” may not be enough to escape 
the Gayssot dilemma. The existence of the Gayssot law (and other 
Holocaust denial bans) would still open up claims about why the 
Holocaust receives special billing.  
What excluding disguised hate speech from the category of memory 
laws does do, however, is remove a powerful argument in favor of 
memory laws, one that applies almost exclusively to genocide denial 
bans—namely, that the law in question is not a memory law at all, but 
actually an effort to combat hatred. By excluding this type of situation 
from the memory law definition, the hate speech in disguise concept adds 
clarity to the arguments against memory laws. To return to Fronza, a 
disguised hate speech ban punishes speakers for “what they do;” by 
bypassing hate speech in disguise, memory law opponents can focus on 
those laws that punish speakers for “what they want” or “[what they] 
are.”32 
II.  A PRELIMINARY TYPOLOGY OF OBJECTIONS TO MEMORY LAWS 
There are three major objections to memory laws. First, people object 
to memory laws because they violate free expression33—an argument 
here could, in theory, cover hate speech as well as other speech 
restrictions, such as libel and obscenity. Second, critics argue that 
memory laws create an official history.34 This, too, is a potentially broad 
argument because it suggests that all memory laws are equally bad to the 
extent that they impose a state backed history.  Holocaust denial bans, in 
this regard, are no different from the 2014 Russian law making it illegal 
to question the feats of the Red Army. In addition, the official history 
objection is sometimes made on behalf of historians—as if they, rather 
 
 30. Hochmann, supra note 15. 
 31. To guarantee that only coded hate speech is punished, one can also require that the 
speech in question be “directed against” the minority group targeted by the denial. Id. 
 32. See Fronza, supra note 12, at 622. 
 33. See infra Part II.A. 
 34. See infra Part II.B. 
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than the state, should determine what the official history is. Finally, the 
freedom of speech and official history objections are focused on speech 
punitive memory laws. While these may well be the most problematic 
memory laws, not all laws affecting memory are punitive. 35 
The missing ingredient is politics—some memory laws are 
objectionable because they promote a narrow, exclusionary image of the 
state, nation or community enacting them.36 In other words, we should 
follow Nikolai Koposov and be more skeptical of those memory laws 
where the state presents itself as a victim, as opposed to situations where 
the state is punishing the denial of its own crimes.37  
The turn to politics allows us to reach beyond speech punitive memory 
laws to cover a variety of state-created memories in areas such as statues, 
street renaming, and the development of curricula in primary and 
secondary schools.38 Simply put, memory laws can be “bad,” even if they 
do not restrict speech. At the same time, the turn to politics connects 
memory laws (i.e. laws about commemorating past events) to a wider set 
of examples in which the state uses law to create a broader or narrower 
group identity.  
In this respect, Koposov’s typology of universal and particularistic 
memory laws mirrors a pre-existing dichotomy in the ethnicity and 
nationalism literature between broad and narrow forms of identity (e.g., 
civic versus ethnic nationalism).39 In other words, the “bad” memory 
laws—which, as seen in Russia, Ukraine, and Poland, confine how 
society can describe its national past—have parallels with other places 
where law is used to reinforce national identity. To take two examples, 
Hungary’s STOP Soros law penalizes those who assist (financially or 
otherwise) illegal immigration.40 Meanwhile, in 2018, Denmark enacted 
a law for immigrants on welfare that separates immigrant children from 
their parents and forbids the children from traveling to their home 
 
 35. See Eric Heinze, Epilogue: Beyond ‘Memory Laws’: Towards a General Theory of Law 
and Historical Discourse,” in LAW AND MEMORY: TOWARDS LEGAL GOVERNANCE OF HISTORY 
413, 418 (Uladzislau Belavusau & Aleksandra Gliszczynska-Grabias eds., 2017). 
 36. See infra, Part II-C. 
 37. Koposov, supra note 1, at 9–10. 
 38. See Uladzislau Belavusau & Anna Wójcik, Renaming streets. A key element of identity 
politics, New Eastern Europe (Apr. 26, 2018), http://neweasterneurope.eu/2018/04/26/renaming-
streets-key-element-identity-politics/.  
 39. See Robert A. Kahn, The Danish Cartoon Controversy and the Exclusivist Turn in 
European Civic Nationalism, in 8 STUDIES IN ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM, 524, 525 (2008) 
(describing the dichotomy between good/Western/civic nationalism and bad/Eastern/ethnic 
nationalism). 
 40. See Tom Szigeti, Hungarian Parliament Passes ‘Stop Soros’ Amendments Modifying 
Judiciary, HUNGARY TODAY (June 21, 2018), https://hungarytoday.hu/hungarian-parliament-
passes-stop-soros-anti-ngo-laws-amendments-modifying-judiciary-and-banning-homelessness/.  
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countries.41 These laws share political similarities to Koposov’s “bad” 
memory laws, even though they focus on the present rather than the past. 
I will take up these laws later in the essay. 
For now, however, let me return to the three objections listed above 
(free speech, official history and bad politics). How do they fare as 
reasons oppose memory bans? Which objection(s) speak with the most 
salience to the current run of memory bans in Eastern Europe and Russia? 
Which objection(s), if any, speak to the problems that arise from the use 
of non-punitive memory laws? In what follows, I describe the pros and 
cons of each objection. As we will see, while each objection has its 
strengths, all three arguments have weaknesses.  
A.  Objections Based on Freedom of Speech 
On one level, free speech arguments are easy. To the extent one is a 
free speech absolutist along the lines of Flemming Rose or Salman 
Rushdie, opposing memory laws is uncontroversial.42 The same is true if 
one takes the slightly more speech-restrictive position echoed by the 
United States Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio.43 In Brandenburg, 
the Court held that speech bans are only legitimate when the speech in 
question incites to “imminent lawless action”44—something most speech 
acts targeted by memory laws manifestly do not do (at least once one 
removes the possibility that some Holocaust denial is coded anti-
Semitism).  Furthermore, punitive memory laws close off opinion, do not 
lead to the truth, raise questions of a slippery slope and cannot be justified 
as necessary to ensure democratic legitimacy.45 Thus, there are powerful 
doctrinal arguments, at least from a United States perspective, for 
objecting to memory laws on free speech grounds. 
There are two added advantages to the free speech objection. The first 
concerns tone. To the extent one takes a consistent civil libertarian 
position, one can simultaneously oppose memory laws and the speech 
acts such laws would punish, a practice well established in the United 
States ever since the 1978 decision protecting the right of neo-Nazis to 
march through a community of Holocaust survivors in Skokie, Illinois.46 
 
 41. See Ellen Barry & Martin Selsoe Sorensen, In Denmark, Harsh New Las for Imigrant 
‘Ghettos,’ N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/01/world/europe/ 
denmark-immigrant-ghettos.html. 
 42. See Robert A. Kahn, Flemming Rose’s Rejection of the American Free Speech Canon 
and the Poverty of Comparative Constitutional Theory, 39 BROOK. J. INT’L L., 657, 690 (2014) 
(describing Rose and Rushdie’s view of the human subject as “a storytelling animal”). 
 43. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 44. Id. At 449. 
 45. Supra note 23, at 67–70. 
 46. See, Robert A. Kahn, The Danish Cartoon Controversy and the Rhetoric of Libertarian 
Regret, 16 U. OF MIAMI INT’L AND COMP. L. REV. 151, 161 (2009) (describing language of liberal 
regret by the court in Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1201 (7th Cir. 1978)). 
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Second, speech-based objections to memory laws lead to the evaluation 
of memory laws on largely technical grounds: How much speech do they 
restrict? What defenses are available to those accused of violating them? 
How severe are the punishments? In effect, the free speech objection 
becomes a measuring stick—the more speech a given memory ban 
covers, the worse it is.47 This technical quality may make the objections 
to memory laws less threatening in a society deeply committed to the 
norms memory laws protect.48  
That said, free speech objection has problems. For one thing, speech-
based arguments against memory laws risk proving too much. Many of 
the countries enacting memory bans also have hate speech laws, which 
also close off opinion, undermine the search for truth, and (depending on 
one’s perspective) lack democratic legitimacy.49 For instance, Eric 
Heinze opposes hate speech bans as democratically illegitimate in 
longstanding, stable prosperous democracies.50 Worse still, to the extent 
the loudest voices against European memory laws come from the other 
side of the Atlantic, we are faced with another example of gun-toting, 
climate pact destroying, Trump-electing all-American cowboys telling 
long suffering Europeans what to do.51 To be sure, some Europeans 
oppose memory laws and hate speech bans, at least in some situations.52 
But there is a real risk that the specific speech harms posed by memory 
laws will be lost in the Euro-American tussle over the legitimacy of hate 
speech restrictions in general.   
The free speech objection has two other difficulties. First, from a 
speech perspective all memory laws are in theory equally bad, regardless 
of what they cover. A ban on Holocaust denial, on this view, is the same 
as a ban denying the World War II exploits of the Soviet Army. Likewise, 
bans on denial of the Armenian genocide are a little different from Article 
301 of the Turkish Penal Code which punishes insults to “Turkishness” 
and has been used to punish those who assert that the Armenian genocide 
occurred.53 Simply put, the free speech argument is too blunt an 
 
 47. See Robert Kahn, Rethinking Blasphemy and anti-Blasphemy Laws, in BLASPHEMY AND 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AFTER THE CHARLIE HEBDO MASSACRE 179–85 (Jeroen Temperman & 
Andras Koltay eds., 2017) (calling for evaluating blasphemy bans based on their severity). 
 48. This was my sense after following the global campaign against Pakistan’s blasphemy 
laws. Id. at 191 (describing the enduring support for blasphemy bans in Pakistan). 
 49. See ERIC HEINZE, HATE SPEECH AND DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP 68–78 (2016). 
50.  See Eric Heinze, Wild-West Cowboys versus Cheese-Eating Surrender Monkeys: Some 
Problems in Comparative Approaches to Hate Speech, in EXTREME SPEECH AND 
DEMOCRACY 182, 185–87 (Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds., 2009). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Heinze, supra note 50; TIMOTHY GARTON ASH, FREE SPEECH: TEN PRINCIPLES FOR 
A CONNECTED WORLD (Yale 2016). To be sure, neither Heinze nor Ash are free speech absolutists. 
 53. See Janisha Tate, Note, Turkey’s Article 301: A Legitimate Tool for Maintaining Order 
or a Threat to Freedom of Expression?, 37 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 182 (2008). 
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instrument to make nuanced political distinctions among various memory 
laws. 
Second, not all memory laws are punitive. For instance, there are 
debates in the United States over the erection and removal of statues of 
Confederate military leaders54 as well as Poland’s recent campaign to 
cleanse street names of anyone who may have had a left-wing 
connection.55 Here, one reaches a crossroads. One can either, like 
Koposov, focus primarily on punitive memory bans56 (and, given the 
great harms punitive sanctions can generate, there are good reasons for 
this), or one needs a broader theory that can evaluate non-punitive 
memory laws as good or bad. Opponents of memory laws need a 
vocabulary for critiquing narrow, slanted, but non-punitive memory laws; 
a focus on free speech, while important in several respects, will not 
provide this.57 
B.  Objections Based on Official History 
Unlike the free speech objection, which in theory could cover hate 
speech bans (and other speech restrictions), the official history objection 
is narrowly focused on memory laws. Moreover, the academic freedom 
concerns raised by the Heinz Richter and Jan Gross cases are real;58 and 
undoubtedly, the French historians of Liberté pour l’Histoire have played 
 
 54. See Rob Kahn, “Charlottesville, Ferguson and ‘Laws Affecting Memory’ in the United 
States,” Workshop on “Legal Governance of Historical Memory in Comparative Perspective,” 
University of California Berkeley, Apr. 2018,          
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324759975_Charlottesville_Ferguson_and_Laws_Aff
ecting_Memory_in_the_United_States.    
 55. See Belavusau & Wójcik, supra note 38. The policy would impact at least 1,000 street 
names. Among those purged are streets honoring people who, while victims of Stalin, had a left-
wing connection of some sort.  
 56. KOPOSOV, supra note 1, at 6. 
 57. Nor do free speech objections necessarily reach the problem of “informal” censorship—
i.e., those situations in which a newspaper, school district, library or other actor decides to impose 
a singular view of history. Informal censorship can limit a speaker’s ability to find an audience 
while shaping how society views the historical event in question. See also, Robert A. Kahn, 
Informal Censorship of Holocaust Revisionism in the United States and Germany, 9 GEO. MASON 
U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 125 (1998). To the extent free speech arguments focus narrowly on criminal 
sanctions, they will not address these types of situations. 
 58. German historian Heinz Richter was prosecuted for denying crimes against humanity 
in 2008 on account of his book, The Battle of Crete, which challenged notions of heroism central 
to Greek national identity. See Ioanna Tourkochoriti, Memory Politics and Academic Freedom: 
Some Recent Controversies in Greece, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Jan. 14, 2018), 
https://verfassungsblog.de/memory-politics-and-academic-freedom-some-recent-controversies-
in-greece/. United States historian Jan Gross aroused controversy—including a law (later 
invalidated on technical grounds) targeting him—after the appearance of his book, Neighbors: 
The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland (2002). See Uladzislau Belavusau 
& Anna Wójcik, Polish Memory Law: When history becomes a source of mistrust, NEW EASTERN 
EUROPE, Feb. 19, 2018, http://neweasterneurope.eu/in-the-magazine/.  
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a role in curbing the growth of memory laws in France, and elsewhere, 
even if they somewhat exaggerate this role.59 The “official history” 
argument also has a political resonance; as early as 1990, French 
conservatives asked why, as the Berlin Wall was collapsing in the East, a 
Stalinist style official history was being imposed in the West.60 In 
addition, the official history argument reflects a broader concern about 
judges and history. Simply put, it violates separation of powers for a 
judge, empowered to resolve disputes in a final way, to pronounce on 
history, which is always open for reevaluation.61 
At the same time, the official history argument has problems. First, 
while “official history” objection seeks to protect historians; are most 
genocide deniers “historians”? Defending Jan Gross or Heinz Richter’s 
academic freedom is easy; doing the same for Robert Faurisson, who does 
have a doctorate in literature, is a harder sell. Consider next the late 
Bernard Lewis, sued in France in the 1990s for denying the Armenian 
genocide.62 He was not sued for his 1961 book The Emergence of Modern 
Turkey; he was sued for an off the cuff remark made during a January 
1994 Le Monde interview.63 Does everything a historian says become an 
issue of academic freedom? What the Faurisson and Lewis examples 
suggest is that as viewpoints become more extreme, and language more 
 
 59. This often takes the form of humble bragging. After noting that Liberté is not “much of 
an organization,” Oliver Salvatori, the group’s secretary, tells Josie Appleton how: “Our ideas 
have won the battle of public opinion.” See Josie Appleton, Freedom for history? The case against 
memory laws, THE FREE SPEECH DEBATE, (Apr. 3, 2013), http://freespeechdebate.com/ 
discuss/freedom-for-history-the-case-against-memory-laws/. Given the explosion of punitive 
memory bans in Eastern Europe over the past decade, Salvatori’s victory celebration may be a bit 
premature. 
 60. See KAHN, supra note 25, at 105. Conservative back benchers hurled insults including 
“Goulag,” “Katyn” and “Bucharest.”  
 61. Bernard Edelman, Paris law clerk, made this argument about the 1980s prosecution of 
Faurisson for falsifying history. Ironically, Judge Hugh Locke, the first judge in the Ernst Zundel 
trial, flipped the lawversus history distinction on its head. Refusing to take judicial notice of the 
Holocaust at Zundel’s trial for spreading false news, Locke refused to reach a final issue on 
innocence or guilt—something that should be left for the jury to decide. See KAHN, supra note 
25, at 35–36, 40–41.   
 62. See YVES TERNON, REMEMBRANCE AND DENIAL: THE CASE OF THE ARMENIAN 
GENOCIDE 244 (Richard G. Hovannisian ed., 1998). 
 63. Asked why the Turks refused to admit the Armenian genocide, Lewis replied “You 
mean the Armenian version of this history.” Id. at 243. While Lewis subsequently expanded on 
his position in a January 1994 op-ed article in Le Monde, which Ternon claims led to the French 
Armenian groups suing him. Id. at 244. He was not reporting academic research or making a 
claim; he was giving his opinion. While this ought to be respected as freedom of speech, the claim 
of academic freedom is weaker here than in the Richter and Gross cases. 
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causal, the “official history” objection becomes less and less about 
protecting academic research.64 
Second, a certain elitism creeps into some versions of the “official 
history” objection. It is one thing to say the state should not set up an 
official history, or even that the state should not threaten historians; it is 
quite another, however, to treat history as the sovereign province of 
professional historians, as some Liberté pour l’Histoire pronouncements 
seem to do. For example, in a 2013 interview with Josie Appleton about 
memory laws, Nora condemned the victim-centered “moralization” of 
history and rejected the argument that the slave trade was a crime against 
humanity as a “judicial absurdity.”65 As I have pointed out elsewhere, this 
not an effective way to encourage members of victim groups to join the 
campaign against memory laws.66 Moreover, historians are just as 
capable as courts of offering narrow-minded history; while historians 
likely will inevitably play a role in the creation of history, I am not sure 
they are the guardians of it (or even the sole producers of it).   
In this regard, compare the tone of Nora’s remarks with Diane 
Ravitch, a specialist in education policy. Describing the impact of 
censorship on high-school history textbooks in the United States, Ravitch 
explained, “To produce history textbooks, teams of writers and editors 
have mastered the art of compression, reducing complex controversies to 
a few lines or a page, smoothing out the rough edges of reality, 
eliminating the confusion and rancor that invariably accompanied major 
crises.”67 Ravitch calls for complex, rough-edged history; she, unlike 
Nora, does not dictate what that history should say. The official history 
objection against memory laws will flourish precisely to the extent that it 
encompasses a broad, popular conception of history, one based on the 
understanding that history comes in many shapes and sizes. Taking an 
open-ended approach increases the chances of winning over memory law 
supporters.68 
 
 64. This concern reaches its apex in the case of Holocaust denial used as coded hate speech. 
Is someone who says: “Go to Israel, you Holocaust hoaxing Jew!” engaging in history in a 
meaningful sense? 
 65. Appleton, supra note 58. For more examples, see Kahn, supra note 23, at 82–89 (noting 
how Liberté supporters oppose multiculturalism as the history of victims and give historians a 
leading role in guarding the national past). 
 66. Kahn, supra note 23, at 92. 
 67. DIANE RAVITCH, THE LANGUAGE POLICE: HOW PRESSURE GROUPS RESTRICT WHAT 
STUDENTS LEARN 134–35 (2003). 
 68. Legal historian Reuel Schiller made a similar point at April 2018 Memory Law Panel 
at Berkeley, California. Faced with memory entrepreneurs, some of whom are also deniers, 
societies should strive to create an educated populace able to understand the nuance of history. In 
the United States, such a public would more concerned about the moral ambiguity of slave-owner 
United States President Thomas Jefferson than worrying about those who seek to “rehabilitate” 
Robert E. Lee or Stonewall Jackson. 
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Meanwhile, the anti-Stalinist “official history” argument raised by the 
French deputies who voted against the Gayssot law is similar to the 
conservative argument in the United States about “political 
correctness”—and suffers from the same problems. In the United States, 
lampooning political correctness appeals to those skeptical of changing 
norms, and the resultant speech restrictions, around issues of race, gender, 
sexual preference and sexual identity. The attack on political correctness, 
however, is less effective, however, in changing the minds of the “social 
justice warriors” who support the norms and speech restrictions.69 The 
same limited persuasiveness is likely true of arguments that France’s 
recognition of the Holocaust, the Atlantic Slave trade, or any other human 
rights tragedy, will recreate the Stalinist police state in the heart of Paris.  
Finally, the official history objection shares some weaknesses with the 
free speech objection. While the official history argument may reach 
some non-punitive memory laws (since street naming, statue removal and 
similar activities could serve an official history) treating a change of a 
street name as an assault on academic freedom risks minimizing the very 
real harms to academic freedom memory laws can pose. Meanwhile, the 
concern about official history, without a probing about what “official” 
means,70 cannot speak to the politics of specific memory laws. After all, 
every imposition of official history should, in theory, be equally bad.  
In the end, the official history objection has a role to play in campaigns 
against memory laws, but it should be used with care. The less elitist it 
is, the more effective it will be. 
C.  Objecting to Memory Laws as “Bad” Politics 
The final category of memory law objections is political. Some 
objections apply to punitive memory laws in general—although one can 
also raise these arguments as free speech objections. For example, the 
concern that memory laws will make a state more authoritarian71  has 
both a political and a legal component. But the strongest political 
arguments apply to a certain category of memory laws, those Koposov 
refers to as narrow, particularistic laws, ones in which the state (or other 
relevant entity) seeks to punish discordant views of history it finds 
threatening to the national image.72 Many of the recent memory laws 
enacted in Russia and Eastern Europe fit this category. A primary 
 
 69. For more about the limits of political correctness arguments, see Rob Kahn, The Anti-
Coddling Narrative and Campus Speech, 15 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1 (2018). 
 70. Clearly all societies have some history that they deem official. Is this problematic when 
enforced in a non-speech punitive way? It may well be, but to reach this point, one needs a political 
critique that does more than trace a given statue, commemoration, high school syllabus, or other 
memory policy to the state. 
 71. See Fronza, supra note 12, at 622. 
 72. See KOPOSOV, supra note 1, at 9–10. 
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characteristic these laws is that they punish those who deny harms 
inflicted on the state. (This stands in contrast to universal memory laws, 
in which the state bans denial of its own crimes, or denial of crimes 
against groups with no direct connection to the state).73 
The argument against particularistic memory bans is simple. Memory 
laws are “bad” to the extent they foster narrow, exclusionary politics. 
This is particularly a concern where, as in Eastern Europe during World 
War II, neighboring groups, such as Poles and Ukrainians, committed 
atrocities against each other.74 These laws reinforce nationalism. They 
also raise international tensions as Country A reacts to Country B’s 
narrow memory law by enacting a law of its own, triggering a mnemonic 
arms race in which each country seeks to police the truth, as it sees it, 
within and outside of its borders. One finds echoes here of Kenneth 
Waltz’s security dilemma:75 Just as each additional arms purchase, by 
fostering a response, makes the initial purchaser less secure, so the 
enacting of narrow memory bans with extra-territorial bite, by 
encouraging neighbors to do the same, ultimately harms the countries 
enacting them.76 
Let me give an example. In 2014 Russia enacted a memory law about 
the Red Army—most likely not for “security purposes” but for 
aggrandizement. In response, Ukraine enacted a series of 
decommunization laws that, in addition to responding to the Russian 
“threat,” also rehabilitated Ukraine’s World War II era guerillas and 
punished those who “disrespected” them.77 Because some of those 
guerillas committed atrocities against Poles,78 Poland saw the new law as 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. See generally Alina Cherviatsova, Gravity of the Past: Polish-Ukrainian Memory War 
and Freedom of Speech,  EJIL: TALK!, Feb. 22, 2018, https://www.ejiltalk.org/gravity-of-the-
past-polish-ukrainian-memory-war-and-freedom-of-speech/ (giving a brief overview of the 
relevant history). 
 75. For more, with an emphasis on the Ukrainian case, see Maria Mälksoo, 
Decommunization in Times of War: Ukraine’s Militant Democracy Problem,” 
VERFASSUNGSBLOG, Jan. 9, 2018, https://verfassungsblog.de/decommunization-in-times-of-war-
ukraines-militant-democracy-problem/.  
 76. See Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” in 30 WORLD POLITICS 
169–70 (1978) (describing security dilemma in a state of anarchy). See also Maria Mälksoo, 
Kononov v. Latvia as an Ontological Security Struggle over Remembering the Second World 
War, in LAW AND MEMORY: TOWARDS LEGAL GOVERNANCE OF HISTORY 91–92 (Uladzislau 
Belavusau & Aleksandra Gliszczynska-Grabias eds., 2017) (describing concerns of ontological 
security).  
 77. See Cherviatsova, supra note 73; Lina Klymenko, Cutting the Umbilical Cord: The 
Narrative of the National Past and Future in Ukrainian De-communization Policy, in LAW AND 
MEMORY: TOWARDS LEGAL GOVERNANCE OF HISTORY 310–28 (Uladzislau Belavusau & 
Aleksandra Gliszczynska-Grabias eds., 2017). 
 78. In response, Poles engaged in a campaign of anti-Ukrainian ethnic cleansing from 1944 
to 1947. See Cherviatsova supra note 73. 
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a threat. This was one of the many reasons for enactment of Poland’s 
2018 law, since revised,79 that punished those who used the phrase 
“Polish concentration camps” to suggest that Poland was responsible for 
the Nazi death camps; it also punished those who suggested that the 
Polish state or nation were complicit in Nazi crimes.80 This led Israel to 
consider enacting a bill accusing Poland of Holocaust denial.81 Although 
it is a bit exaggerated, this example shows how a mnemonic arms race 
can spread across a region. 
Second, the political objection lets us focus on specific memory laws 
while also reaching non-punitive memory laws. One can now, for 
example, distinguish calls in the Southern United States to remove 
Confederate statues in the name of recognizing the harms of slavery and 
segregation from Poland’s changes of place names to exclude anyone 
with a left-wing past.82 There will, of course, be judgment calls, and 
scholars will disagree about which memory laws are universal and which 
are particularistic; there is a perverse incentive for memory law 
proponents to present their laws as universal—and, therefore, as 
“good.”83 That said, the universal versus particularistic framework is a 
helpful way to evaluate specific memory laws, including non-punitive 
ones, which is something the other objections struggle with.  
At the same time, the political objection has its own challenges. First, 
the literature on ethnicity and nationalism has struggled with the question 
of “good” nationalism;84 can there be a “good” memory law? Perhaps 
memory laws (at least punitive ones) are not always bad—some are just 
worse than others. Alternatively, is it fair to label nationalism or memory 
laws as “bad” if Fredrik Barth is correct that maintaining boundaries, i.e. 
creating an “Other,” is a fundamental part of human life?85 Either position 
seems to undercut efforts to separate nationalisms (and memory laws) 
into “good” and “bad” categories. Even if one could do this, what about 
 
 79. Christian Davies, Poland makes partial U-turn on Holocaust law after Israeli row, THE 
GUARDIAN, June 27, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/27/poland-partial-u-
turn-controversial-holocaust-law. The proposed revision will remove the criminal penalties. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Lahav Harkov, Majority of Knesset backs bill accusing Poland of Holocaust denial, 
THE JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 31, 2018, https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Majority-of-Knesset-
backs-bill-accusing-Poland-of-Holocaust-denial-540311. 
 82. See Belavusau & Wójcik, supra note 38. 
 83. For an example, see Kahn, supra note 53, at 11–16 (describing efforts of Polish Prime 
Minister Mateusz Morawiecki to defend the Poland’s law against accusations of anti-Semitism by 
highlighting the revival of Jewish culture in Poland). 
 84. The doubts about the existence of a good nationalism have a historical basis. In the 
words of Peter Alter: “Between 1918 and 1945, nationalism became synonymous with 
intolerance, inhumanity and violence.” See Peter Alter, Nationalism: An Overview, in 
NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICT at 19 (1994). 
 85. Fredrik Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, in ETHNIC GROUPS AND BOUNDARIES: 
THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCE at 37 (1969). 
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the possibility of Orientalizing?86 Is the project of distinguishing the 
Gayssot Law from Ukraine’s decommunization laws simply one more 
way of privileging an advanced West over a primitive East? 
One silver lining of our times is that—in the age of Wilders, Le Pen, 
and Trump—one can no longer cabin “bad” nationalism to the “East.” 
Xenophobic populism is alive and well in the United States, the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Poland, and Hungary.87 Indeed, one of the most 
longstanding nationalisms of the last two centuries—the Lost Cause 
tradition of the Confederacy—flourished in the heart of the West.88 The 
particularistic versus universal distinction—while presented in East 
versus West terms, and subject to manipulation—at bottom rests on a 
clear distinction; is the community punishing the denial of its own past 
suffering, or of its own crimes against another group? This distinction, in 
turn, tells us whether the state, nation, or society in question takes a closed 
or open posture towards its past.89 
Assuming one can distinguish memory laws based on their politics, a 
second concern emerges. A memory law’s politics can be good or bad in 
two different ways. On the one hand, one can focus on the international 
situation and the scope of the law and ask, comparatively speaking, 
whether the memory law is justifiable. On the other hand, one can look 
at who or what the memory law rehabilitates. Sometimes the answers to 
these questions point in the same direction: Article 301 of the Turkish 
Penal Code, used to prop up an authoritarian state, punishes those who 
speak the truth about the Armenian genocide. Both the international 
politics and the subject matter of the law are problematic.  On the other 
side of the spectrum, the Gayssot law, while still sharing the speech and 
academic freedom concerns that attach to all punitive memory laws, 
recognizes a harm suffered by a minority group. Here, both the politics 
and subject matter of the memory law are “good”—or at least as good 
one can expect of a memory law. 
 
 86. For instance, Maria Mälksoo argues that some critics of Ukraine’s decommunization 
laws have engaged in a rhetoric of an “implicitly…Orientalizing and infantilizing kind” by 
downplaying the security dilemma Ukraine faced in enacting its law. See Mälksoo, 
Decommunization in Times of War, supra note 74. 
 87. To put it another way, both Denmark and Hungary have harsh anti-immigrant policies. 
One might distinguish Denmark’s law as “civic” in nature, and the Hungarian law as “ethnic” 
since the Danish law seeks to “assimilate” immigrant children, while Hungary seeks to keep out 
immigrants entirely. At the end of the day, however, the harshness of both laws may matter more 
than the nature of their operating principles.  
 88. For more, see Kahn, supra note 53. 
 89. In a similar way, the dichotomy between ethnic and civic nationalism has an East versus 
West valence but, in the end, turns on a real difference: Can people become part of the nation by 
adopting its civic norms? 
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For a harder case, consider Ukraine’s decommunization laws.90 The 
international context, while not ideal, seems better than many other 
Eastern European memory laws. Ukraine passed the laws in response to 
Russian memory laws and actual Russian territorial aggression; if 
mnemonic security could ever justify a memory law, this would seem to 
be the place.91 Moreover, the scope of the law was narrower than those 
enacted in neighboring states. At the same time, however, the Ukrainian 
law rehabilitated the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), 
which was responsible for the Volhynian massacres against the Poles in 
1943 and 1944. Indeed, the law made it illegal “to publicly display a 
disrespectful attitude” toward OUN members.92 Not only does Ukraine’s 
law, therefore, make it illegal to minimize crimes against Ukrainians; it 
punishes those who question the state’s effort to rehabilitate those 
Ukrainians who committed crimes against others. 
This leads to a quandary. Should the Ukrainian law be defended—at 
least as compared to other laws in the region—for its legal moderation 
and the provocation from Russia?93 Or should the rehabilitation of OUN 
members make it an especially bad memory law?94 There is not an easy 
answer here. Less speech restrictive memory laws should be preferred 
over those that punish more speech; and the package of Ukrainian 
decommunization laws, of which the rehabilitation of the OUN members 
was just a part, may well have some justification. But it is hard to get 
excited about a memory law that rehabilitates people who committed 
crimes against humanity. Perhaps the way forward here is to oppose, in a 
blanket fashion, any law whose goal is to whitewash the past. One could 
take this position, even while accepting that Ukraine had cause, given the 
threat from Russia, for taking some action to secure its past. 
On another level, the Ukrainian case highlights the importance for 
countering the politics of the past with a future-oriented politics. Ideally, 
the response to a threatening memory should be something other than a 
call for more security. There are several ways of envisioning this politics. 
One could, for example, follow Hedley Bull and seek to temper the 
 
 90. See Cherviatsova, supra note 73. 
 91. See Uladzislau Belavusau, Final Thoughts on Mnemonic Constitutionalism, 
VERFASSUNGSBLOG, Jan 15, 2018, https://verfassungsblog.de/final-thoughts-on-mnemonic-
constitutionalism/; see also Mälksoo, supra note 74. 
 92. See Cherviatsova, supra note 73.  
 93. See Belavusau, supra note 90 (taking this position). 
 94. For example, one commentator expressed his displeasure about the “relatively muted” 
international response to the Ukrainian decommunization laws, which he attributed to a 
sympathetic attitude toward Ukraine given the challenges it was facing in the West. See Samuel 
Sokol, Is Poland’s Holocaust law changing US attitudes towards Ukraine’s memory laws?” OPEN 
DEMOCRACY, Apr. 26, 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/samuel-sokol/is-us-
acceptance-of-poland-and-ukraine-s-memory-laws-beginning-to-change.  
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turbulence of the anarchical society of memory laws95 by banning the use 
of memory laws as means of interstate aggression as an international 
norm, much as a little less than a hundred years ago states rejected the 
use of poison gas as a means of war.96 Alternatively, activists could seek 
to build a cosmopolitan memory, one that based on the free flow of ideas 
and the multiple identities present in nations, states, cities and 
individuals.97 Such an identity would undermine the need to promote 
narrow, nationalistic identities. More pessimistically, memory law 
opponents could focus on free speech argument that, for all its analytical 
limitations, offers a way for memory law opponents to make their case 
without being seen as attacking the nation. 
In the end, the political objection to memory laws has great promise 
but some peril. The promise comes from the ability to target why a given 
memory law—punitive or not—is objectionable. At the same time, 
dividing memory laws into particularistic and universal categories—the 
former of which is marked “bad”—will likely persuade those already 
opposed to self-oriented, defensive nationalism. When it comes to 
convincing the nationalists themselves, the political arguments may 
prove less helpful than a combination of more traditional free speech 
approaches combined with efforts to create a new universalism that 
nevertheless has a radical, countercultural appeal.98 
 
 95. HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF WORLD ORDER (1977). 
 96. There is a debate over why chemical weapons have largely not been used since World 
War I. See Richard Price, A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo, 49 INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION 1, 73–103 (Winter 1995). Some observers, such as Price, argue that a moral stigma 
against such weapons plays a role—even if combined with other factors.  On the other hand, 
military historian Mark Perry, writing in Politico, makes the argument that chemical weapons 
ceased to be used because they are relatively ineffective as weapons of war.  See Mark Perry, Why 
the world banned chemical weapons, POLITICO, Apr. 16, 2017, 
https://www.politico.eu/article/why-the-world-banned-chemical-weapons/. This suggests that 
memory law opponents should rely both on a moral stigma argument (memory laws are a form of 
intellectual arson, etc.) as well as an argument that, as a tool of national policy, punitive memory 
laws are less effective in securing the state than the appear to be—which might be one way of 
describing Poland’s 2018 experience with its memory law.  
 97. In this regard, one might ask if the “left-wing” activists whose names are being taken 
off Polish streets might, ironically, be the people who a country like Poland should be celebrating, 
to the extent they bridge the gap between the many different pasts Poland encompasses. For 
instance, Bronisław Taraskiewicz, one of the street naming the Polish authorities changed, was a 
Belarusian linguist is persecuted in both Poland and the Soviet Union, a quality that might make 
him an ideal symbol for a genuinely cosmopolitan Poland. See Belavusau & Wójcik, supra note 
38. 
 98. See, e.g., ASAD HAIDER, MISTAKEN IDENTITY: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AGE OF TRUMP 
(Verso 2018). Haider, a Muslim American born in Pennsylvania, views the move to identity 
politics as a retreat from the radicalism of the Black Power movement, a radicalism he hopes to 
restore in the name of an “insurgent universality.” Id. at 114.  
18
Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 31 [], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol31/iss1/2
2019] FREE SPEECH, OFFICIAL HISTORY AND NATIONALIST POLITICS 51 
 
III.  MEMORY LAWS AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 
The path to finding this new, radical universalism will be easier if the 
study of memory laws is seen as part of nationalism and identity studies. 
The narrow, particularistic type of memory law that fosters exclusionary 
politics is part of a larger category of laws that foster a sense of belonging 
by (to return to Fronza) fostering “a single interpretation” of identity. 
Another example of this broader category are immigration restrictions, 
which ensure that the nation, whose past memory laws supposedly 
preserve, remains the same. Interestingly, some of the countries that enact 
the harshest memory laws are also reluctant to admit new immigrants. 
Here we might add to Koposov’s categories of universal and 
particular, a third category of exclusionary memory laws. A memory law 
may be particularistic, but be open to those willing to accept the memory 
as their own. Let me give some examples. During the 19th century 
Hungarian identity was—at least theoretically—open to anyone willing 
to learn the Magyar language.99 By contrast, exclusionary memory laws 
seek to protect the national past by excluding those who might potentially 
have a different view of history. The state excludes people before they 
have a chance to accept or reject the norms the memory laws enforce. 
This is one way to understand the Hungarian STOP Soros law and the 
Danish welfare immigration law. In stopping what it sees as a threat to 
Hungarian national identity posed by immigrants (and émigré George 
Soros), the Orban government is attempting to fossilize Hungarian 
identity (and history) by making sure that the nation state remains 
ethnically Hungarian.100 While not a memory law per se, the STOP Soros 
law promotes, by force of law, a vision of Hungarian identity, one based 
on a myth of common descent. In addition, the STOP Soros law, like 
many memory laws, punishes speech—by making it illegal to advise 
“illegal” immigrants about potential asylum claims.101  
The Danish welfare law is an even closer fit with punitive memory 
bans. The law defines immigrant Danes living in certain specified low-
income neighborhoods as “ghetto” immigrants.102 By separating “ghetto” 
children from their “ghetto” parents for 25 hours each week, during which 
the children are inculcated with Danish values, and forbidding trips to the 
 
 99. Granted, there were specific reasons for this, including the fact that native Magyar 
speakers were a minority in the Hungarian half of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
 100. One sees this with the government’s fixation with George Soros as well as with its 
statement about the then proposed legislation, which described how “millions are about to move 
to Europe from Africa and the Middle East.” Government of Hungary, Organization of illegal 
migration should be made a punishable offense, June 6, 2018, http://www.kormany.hu/en/ 
ministry-of-interior/news/organisation-of-illegal-migration-should-be-made-a-punishable-
offence.  
 101. See Szigeti, supra note 40. 
 102. See Barry & Selsoe Sorensen, supra note 41. 
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old country, the Danish government is shaping the present by creating 
citizens who will not be receptive to threatening memories about the past. 
In other words, instead of going after the supply of threatening speech, as 
most memory laws do, Denmark has taken a demand side approach. By 
isolating a group of citizens who might be attracted to threatening 
thoughts or values, Denmark hopes to render certain ideas harmless. As 
in the Hungarian example, the exclusion takes place; but instead of 
excluding people, the Danish law excludes thought. 
More generally, viewing memory laws through the lens of national 
identity highlights the connections between the particularism of recent 
memory laws and the anti-immigrant politics sweeping across North 
America and Europe.103 While there are differences between the two 
phenomena—memory laws have a symbolic impact, whereas 
immigration restrictions have practical effects, both types of restrictions 
originate from the same style of politics, one that, as Koposov puts it, has 
turned away from the future and is firmly focused on the past.104 Efforts 
to create a future-oriented politics that will unsettle the current 
xenophobic mood would benefit from studying the origins, mechanisms 
and contradictions of nationalism. 
CONCLUSION: THE IMPORTANCE OF OBJECTING TO MEMORY LAWS ON 
MULTIPLE GROUNDS 
As Eric Heinze has pointed out, memory laws—punitive or not—are 
not new; indeed, they have been present for thousands of years.105 The 
Gayssot law and its progeny, however, are new; and the recent, 
particularistic memory laws of Russia and Eastern Europe are newer still. 
This novelty complicates the task of opposing memory laws. Free speech 
objections to memory laws are relatively politically easy to make, since 
freedom of speech retains some universal appeal. Yet the free speech 
argument, while perhaps necessary when dealing with punitive memory 
laws, cannot say why a specific memory law is objectionable and may, in 
fact, apply to other speech restrictions (such as hate speech bans) some 
see as legitimate. 
The official history objection is initially more promising given that it 
targets memory laws directly. However, it creates the impression that all 
targets of such laws are, in fact, historians, and some proponents seem to 
 
 103. Such a move will also unlock a treasure trove of literature on ethnicity and nationalism 
that might be helpful to the study of memory laws. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 3; BENEDICT 
ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGINS AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 
(1991); ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM (1983); JOHN BREIULLY, NATIONALISM 
AND THE STATE (1993). 
 104. KOPOSOV, supra note 1, at 53–55 (placing the move toward memory in the context of a 
neo-liberal moment in which the future appears unappealing). 
 105. Heinze, supra note 35, at 415. 
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want to become “guardians of history” themselves, while demonizing 
memory law advocates for their faulty victim-based history. On the other 
hand, a more neutral approach, one that genuinely views history as 
something anyone can do, may be more successful at defending 
protecting academic freedom.106 
Lastly, one can object to memory laws on political grounds. The 
political approach lets one distinguish between good (or tolerable) 
universal memory laws (in which the state punishes the denial of its own 
crimes) from “bad” particularistic memory laws (in which the state 
punishes those who minimize the harms against the national community). 
The political approach also highlights the harm memory laws pose for 
international relations. At the same time, however, attempts to distinguish 
“good” from “bad” memory laws run into questions of Orientalism as 
well as how to evaluate otherwise good laws that rehabilitate bad people. 
Finally, will political objections matter where they are most important—
within the country enacting the “bad” memory laws? In this regard, the 
other two objections (free speech and official history) may be more 
politically persuasive even as they are less analytically precise. 
In another sense, the politics behind memory laws is indispensable. 
The explosion of memory laws owes much to a global surge in nativism, 
one expressed not only in memory laws but also in laws intended to 
preserve national identity in the present. Often these laws govern some 
aspect of immigration. To understand these laws, and the surrounding 
political climate that creates them, we should expand our discipline to 
incorporate the literature of ethnicity and national identity, with an 
emphasis on how nations use law to regulate national identity. Doing so 
will increase the chances of replacing the current turn toward the past 
with an “insurgent” (or resurgent) universalism capable of pushing back 
against the age of Trump and Putin. 
 
 106. Here I have in mind both Ravitch’s open mindedness as to what history is, see RAVITCH, 
supra note 66, as well as Reuel Schiller’s focus on educating the potential consumers of history. 
These approaches seem more likely to win converts than the historians of Liberté pour l’Histoire.  
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